














Infrastructure. Human Capital and International Trade
It is by now a trite commonplace that we live in an
increasingly integrated global economy, in which the barriers to
the free movement of goods and capital, though not labor, are
rapidly disappearing as a result of both policy reforms and the
progress of technology in transport and communications. The
rhetoric as well as the substance of national economic policy is
now preoccupied with the problem of how each country can hope to
survive and prosper in a world where capital controls and trade
restrictions are off the agenda. Is the simple laissez - faire
principle of simply doing nothing correct, or is there anything
an activist government might usefully strive to accomplish? With
the global pool of capital at any instant restlessly searching
for the highest return, regardless of borders, a popular
prescription has come to be the provision of public
infrastructure and the training and education of the labor force.
With these measures the nation can attempt to secure for itself a
higher share of the global capital stock and thus ensure for
itself higher wages and better quality jobs for its own labor
force.
This approach to the role of public policy at the national
level has been articulated most extensively in the well-known
book by Robert Reich (1991), currently Secretary of Labor in the
Clinton Administration. Though the book has been favorably
reviewed in the popular press, it has basically been ignored by
academic economists. This seems to me to be a pity since very
much of interest remains to be learned about the combined impact
of such measures on trade flows, capital movements and factor
rewards as well as the appropriate response in terms of these
measures to exogenous external shocks. The recent preoccupation
of trade economists with so-called "strategic trade policy"
seems, by contrast, already to be somewhat passb with the waning
of confidence in selective industrial policies that attempt to
"pick winners". Measures such as the provision of public
overhead capital and the education and training of the labor
force raise the general level of economic performance even though
some sectors may be more sensitive and responsive to such support
than the economic system as a whole. These policies are entirely
consistent with Adam Smith's delineation of the "duties of the
sovereign" in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations and do not
constitute distorting intervention in the working of competitive
markets.
To even begin an adequate treatment of these issues one
requires an analytical framework that explicitly incorporates the
role of government in the economy as the provider of law and
order, enforcer of contracts and so on without which the
transactions of the private sector would take place under
conditions of anarchy. An approach that I have taken in Findlay
and Wilson (1987) and in several recent papers with Richard
Clarida is to model government as providing a public intermediate
input that constitutes a collective externality to all private
industries and activities, thus enhancing their productivity.
The rest of this paper provides an integrated survey and summary
of the main themes of this body of work.
(i) The Optimal Size of Government
Before considering applications to international trade and
factor mobility it will be useful to look at the simplest
possible demonstration of the role of government as the provider
of public intermediate inputs. What follows is an outline of the
approach first adopted in Findlay and Wilson (1987).
This model is specified by postulating an aggregate
production function
Y = A(Lg)F[K,Lp] (1)
in which F[K,Lp] is an ordinary neoclassical production function
with positive first derivatives, negative second derivatives for
each factor and a positive cross-derivative. The novelty is in
the "scale coefficient" A(Lg) in which
A'(Lg) > 0,A"(Lg) < 0,A(0) = 1
where Lg is labor hired by the government to provide the public
intermediate input A(Lg) that enhances the private production
function F(K,LP), where K is capital and Lp is labor in the
private sector. We also have
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Lg+LP=L (2)
where L, the total supply of labor, is given.
More Lg makes the private sector more productive but drains
labor from the fixed pool.Thus Y(Lg) is a concave function that
has a well-defined maximum at the point where the marginal
productivity of labor in the two uses, government and private,
are equal.This first order condition is
F\K,LP]A'(Ls)=A(Lg)%; (3)
It is apparent that the optimal solution is for Lg to be at
the level L*g that satisfies (3) . This solution is implemented by
a proportional tax on national income Y that is just sufficient
to enable the government to hire L*g at the wage w, equal to the
marginal productivity of labor in the private sector. Thus
(4)
completes the specification of the optimal size of government.
In Figure 1 the concave function is government revenue tY(Lg)
which is simply proportional to national income as a function of
Lg, namely Y(Lg). The positively sloped function wLg is
government expenditure. It is convex upward because the wage w
increases with government employment Lg, because the marginal
productivity of labor in the private sector is an increasing
function of Lg .
The model can also be used to illustrate government as a
self-interested "Leviathan" instead of an enlightened despot or
Platonic guardian. Thus, in Figure 1, even if the Leviathan is
obliged to obey the tax function tY(Lg) he will not provide the
socially optimal level L*g of public employment. Instead he will
maximize his surplus, equal to the vertical distance between the
revenue function tY(Lg) and the expenditure function wZ,g.This is
A
the point at which their slopes are equal, at Lg level of public
A A
employment. The maximized surplus tY(Lg) minus wLg is available
for the personal disposition of the sovereign, on himself or his
chosen favorites.
Alternatively, instead of a surplus-maximizing monarch or
dictator, society may be at the mercy of a bureaucracy, a la
Parkinson or Niskanen. Thus if the tax rate were to be higher
than what is just sufficient to attain the optimum, the
expenditure function wLg will interest the concave revenue
function tY(Lg) on its falling portion. The bureaucracy, if it
operates unchecked, will then exhaust the budget at public
employment equal to Lg , even though this is a palpable waste of
society's resources.
The model, though extremely simple, thus has the virtue of
demonstrating not only the optimal size of government but also
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the "political economy" of deviations from the optimum in either
direction because of the principal-agent problem as it arises in
the context of the state. Monitoring the state, or "guarding the
guardian," is no easy task.
(ii) Infrastructure and Comparative Advantage
The one-good closed economy model of the previous section is
extended into a much richer general equilibrium context in
Clarida and Findlay (1991, 1992). The key idea here is to divide
the private sector into two branches, one producing
technologically advanced or "hi-tech" goods, which we take to be
particularly sensitive to the provision of infrastructure in the
form of the public intermediate input, and traditional goods that
are less responsive in this regard. In addition, we distinguish
between "productive" government expenditure such as we have been
considering, on the one hand, and the provision of direct final
public services of the "welfare state" type on the other. This
enables us to look at differences in social "tastes" for the two
types of government activity and to trace the consequences
for production, trade and factor rewards.
The technology in this model is given by
(5)
(6)
where T and W stand for "Tech" and "Wheat", K for "capital" and
N for "land", which are the "specific factors" in the
Ricardo-Viner model as introduced by Jones (1971). The
Cobb-Douglas specification is for convenience and the common
labor elasticity (1-5) is to avoid gratuitous asymmetry between
the two sectors. The key assumption is that
so that the Tech sector is more responsive to the public
intermediate input A(Lg) than Wheat.
We also introduce final public services as Ls into the model
so that we have
All agents have an identical and homothetic utility function
U=U(cT,cw) (8)
where cT and cw are the per capita consumption of Tech and Wheat.
The over-all utility function V is separable in final
public services S (equal to Ls) and U so that we have, for
convenience again
F = SW X> (9)
where X is the weight attached to public services in overall
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utility.
Profit maximization in the private sector will equate the
marginal products of labor in Tech and Wheat to the common real
wage, simultaneously determining also the returns to each of the
specific factors. Labor in the public sector, both LA and Ls,
will receive the same real wage as in the private sector. The key
efficiency condition is therefore that the marginal productivity
of labor in providing the public intermediate input must be equal
to the wage, so that we have
l^[iiA/(LAY-1 =w (10)
where p is the relative price of Tech and w is the wage.
Notice that the marginal productivity of LA is the
Lindahl-Samuelson "vertical" sum of its contributions to both
production sectors.
While the reader must turn to the originals for the details
of the solution, the flavor of the results can perhaps be
apprehended intuitively. One can construct the excess supply
function ET\P,LA(P)] of Tech in which
To derive these properties let us first hold Ls constant
Next observe that when LA is held constant the model behaves
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exactly as in the standard Jones Viner-Ricardo model. Raising p
will thus increase the supply of T and reduce the demand for it,
while the opposite is the case for W. Thus, we see that the
first property obviously holds. Increasing LA while holding p
constant expands Tech relatively more than Wheat because \i is
between zero and unity while demand for both increases by a
weighted average of the two supply increases, thus increasing Er,
so that the second property holds. The third property follows
from the fact that the rise in p makes Tech more valuable and
hence raises the social benefit at the margin from having more
LA .
The equilibrium value of p, and hence of LA and the whole
system, for the given value of Ls, is found by putting ET\P,LA(P)]
equal to zero. The per capita production levels of Tech and
Wheat, fed into the utility function U of (8), give us U(Ls), the
equilibrium level of per capita utility for the given value of
Ls.
It is obvious that raising Ls will reduce U, since K and N
are fixed and (L-Ls) is now smaller. We thus have a negativity
sloped possibility frontier between U and Ls on which the
overall utility function V can be superimposed to determine the
optimal values of Ls and U. Letting the excess supply function
ET\P,LA(P)] be the one defined for the optimal value L*s of Ls we
obtain p*, L*A and the full optimal values of the rest of the
-1-
system.
We now introduce international trade. Of course differences
in factor endowments or technology will obviously create a basis
for trade, in this context as in more traditional settings. It
is perhaps more interesting to explore the consequences of just a
single difference, the relative weight of final public services
X in the overall utility function V defined in (9). Thus our
two countries will be identical in endowments of K, N and L and
in technology and "private" tastes as defined in the sub-utility
function U in (8) .
Under these circumstances the possibility frontier U(Ls)
will be the same for the two countries but the one with a higher
value of X in its overall utility function V will have a higher
L*s and a lower U* in autarky. It is apparent that the higher L*s
will imply that its autarky excess supply function ET\P,LA(P)]
will be shifted to the left as compared with the other country
since the lower (L-L*s) will imply a lower value of L*A . Thus p*
in autarky will be higher, along with the lower L*A , as indicated
in Figure 2.
Thus the preference for S will imply that the production
functions for both T and W will be Hicks - neutrally inferior in
this country, though differentially more so in T, because of the
lower value of the public intermediate input L*A . The relative
scarcity of Tech is reflected in the higher p* in autarky. What
- / 0 -
happens when free trade is opened between the countries? The
equilibrium condition is now that world excess supply be zero,
instead of each national one individually. The world equilibrium
price p*w will be in between the two autarky prices, falling
in the high X country and rising in the low X one, again as
depicted in Figure 2.
Since trade raises p* in the low X country, i.e., it moves
up its positively sloped excess supply function, LA will increase
as well and so it would appear that trade induces Hicks-neutral
technological improvements in both T and W, though
differentially more in T, as compared with autarky. In addition
there is of course the rise in LT because of the rise in p*, for
any given value of LA, while Lw contracts.
In the high X country, on the other hand, LA falls along
with p* and so absolute efficiency declines in both production
functions, relatively more so in T. The gain to the high X
country from trade is of course that it expands L*s, final public
services, which it cares relatively more about at the margin.
Wages and the return to capital both rise in the low X
country as a result of trade and even the fall in the return to
land is mitigated by the rise in L*A which augments productivity
in Wheat. In the high X country, on the other hand, wages and
the return to capital both fall and only the return to land
increases.
It is evident that this model has features that cannot be
found in the standard trade models. The main novelty is the
"endogeneity" of the technology in response to the relative price
changes induced by the opening to trade. Notice that these are
not assumed ad hoc but are the consequences of rational
government action in a first - best setting that scrupulously
respects the preferences of private agents. While
"infrastructure" is sometimes, though not frequently, invoked
in trade contexts it has never, to the best of my knowledge,
been endogenized explicitly in a general equilibrium setting
rather than merely playing a passive role as an underlying
structural factor.
International capital mobility can also be introduced quite
readily into the model. As we have seen the rate of return to
capital is boosted by trade in the Tech exporter and lowered in
the Wheat exporter. This occurs not only because of the relative
product price change, as in the standard Viner-Ricardo model, but
more importantly because of the induced productivity changes due
to the expansion or contraction of the public intermediate input.
If we postulate the perfect mobility of capital across borders,
in addition to free trade in goods, the Tech exporter will
receive an inflow of capital from the Wheat exporter. This of
course leads to more Tech production at constant relative product
prices in the low X country and less in the high X country.
Thus, LA will expand in the former and contract in the latter,
inducing further adjustments of Tech production in the same
direction as induced by the opening to trade. Capital mobility,
however, because it leads to a world excess supply of Tech at the
original free trade price ratio, will induce a deterioration in
the terms of trade of the Tech exporter relative to free trade
alone. This cannot, however, overturn the direction of the sharp
changes in productivity, wages and the return to capital noted
earlier.
(iii) Infrastructure. Human Capital and International Capital
Mobility
The role of human capital in international trade first came
into prominence in connection with explanations for the Leontief
Paradox. Thus Kenen (1965), for example, added measures of
human to physical capital for exports and import-competing
production and found exports to be slightly more
capital-intensive on the whole than the import-competing sectors,
thus "resolving" the Paradox . Several other papers strongly
established the proposition that the U.S. enjoyed a clear
comparative advantage in skill-intensive products and that
developing countries, on the other hand, were competitive in
products that were more intensive in raw labor. Findlay and
Kierzkowski (1983) first incorporated endogenous wage
differentials and human capital formation into an explicit
two-country general equilibrium trade model, thus providing a
theoretical basis for these empirical results.
While the model of the previous section incorporates
"infrastructure" into a standard trade model, it leaves open the
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interesting interactions between infrastructure conceived as a
public intermediate input and education and human capital
formation which, though often publicly financed and provided, are
nevertheless essentially private goods. As we have seen, Robert
Reich and other policy advocates have made much of both
infrastructure generally and education of the work force as
ingredients of a strategy towards trade and growth that does not
involve selective intervention or "picking winners" as in
so-called strategic trade policy.
Both the work of Reich and the German concept of
Standortswettbewerb, or "locational competition", stress the role
of infrastructure and education in acting as "magnets" to attract
the pool of global capital to be diverted within their borders.
Thus the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994), in his
stimulating new book on the history of the present century, could
not be more wrong when he states (p. 281) that "The most
convenient world for multinational giants is one populated by
dwarf states or no states at all." On the contrary ,
multinationals like strong, politically stable states that can
provide infrastructure and educated labor forces, neither of
which are extensively available in most of the feeble and corrupt
"soft" states that are all too evident in much of the Third
World. Thus, Singapore, the favorite locale for multinational
corporations from all over the developed world, is a proverbially
tough, independent and intrusive state. What makes it so popular
as a host country for direct foreign investment is precisely its
superb infrastructure and educated population, neither of which
could have been built up without a conscious effective state
policy.
Once again, we need an appropriate framework within which to
study the role of these factors. In Findlay (1994) I develop a
model that attempts to do this. It postulates a small open
economy that takes relative product prices and the interest rate
as given by the outside world. It produces two goods, one a
"hi-tech" sector and the other a "traditional" sector. Both use
physical capital, in perfectly elastic supply at the world
interest rate, but the advanced sector uses skilled labor and the
traditional one only raw labor. There is an endogenous process
of human capital formation determined by relative wage
differentials and the cost of education. The government can
provide final public services or a public intermediate input that
impacts differentially on the two sectors as in the model of the
previous section.
The production functions for the two sectors, now designated
X any Y are:
X = A(LA))FX[KX,S] (11)
(12)
in which A(LA) has the same properties as before and \x is again
between zero and unity. Skilled labor, used exclusively in the
-15-
X sector, is denoted S, while Ly is raw labor allocated to
production in the Y sector. LA as before is employment engaged
in providing the public intermediate input. Kx and Ky denote
physical capital allocated to the respective sectors. Denoting
unskilled labor used to provide final public services as Ls we
have the labor force constraints
S+L=N (13)
LA+LS+LY = L (14)
where N is the total number of workers, skilled and unskilled,
that is available.
Letting p denote the fixed world relative price of X and r
the interest rate, profit maximization results in
(15)
(17)
where v and w denote the factor rewards of skilled and unskilled
labor respectively. Note that because of constant returns to
scale the marginal products of the two private inputs in each
sector are functions only of the ratio of these inputs in each
case.
Efficiency in the provision of the public intermediate input
requires that
pFxA'(LA) +FYvA'(LAy-1 =w (19)
where the left-hand side is the marginal value product of labor
in infrastructure. Note that it is the Lindahl-Samuelson
"vertical" sum of its contribution at the margin to each of the
two private production sectors that it influences. Total
government expenditure is
E = w(LG +LA) = t\pX+ Y\ (20)
which has to be equal to revenue obtained by a proportional tax t
on total national income \pX+Y].
The preference side of the model is exactly analogous to the
model of the previous section so that equations (8) and (9)
apply.
Finally, we introduce the endogenous formation of human
capital. The rate of return on human capital is defined as
p = p(9,5) (21)
where 0 is the ratio of the skilled wage v to the unskilled wage
w. It is natural to postulate that
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ae ' v' es ^  v
i.e., that a rise in the ratio of v to w raises the return on
human capital while a rise in the stock of skilled workers
reduces it, due say to congestion in the education system that
trains the flow of new entrants that would be needed to replace
departures in the steady state, as in Findlay and Kierzkowski
(1983) .
The equilibrium condition for the supply of skilled labor is
that
p(0,*S) = r (22)
i.e., the return on human capital must be equal to the world rate
of interest and hence to the domestic marginal product of
physical capital in the two sectors.
The solution of the model can once again be briefly
outlined. In spite of the difference in structure, it is
essentially similar to the solution of the previous model.
First, take Ls and LA as fixed. Once again we then essentially
have the Jones (1971) model. The ratio of S to Kx and of Ly to
Ky, are uniquely determined by (15) and (16) for the given value
of LA, and hence the wage rates v and w as well from (17) and
(18). The ratio of v to w determines 0 and so the value of S
that satisfies (22). From (13) and (14) this determines L and Ly
and so Kx and Ky from the production functions. After allowing
for net interest payments to or from abroad we can compute
national income and hence per capita consumption and the level of
utility U.
Continuing to hold Ls constant we now vary LA. Computing
the Lindahl - Samuelson marginal product of LA from (19) and
comparing it with the wage w we can decide whether LA is to be
increased or reduced. Suppose the left hand side of (19) exceeds
w, so that LA has to be increased. Note that this will raise
both v and w by equations (15) to (18), but v proportionately
more than v because |i is between zero and unity. Hence
sr>°
and so S must rise to make (22) continue to hold and Ly must
fall. This raises X and reduces Y but increases U since the
endowment of the economy is now more favorable because of the
improvement in the skill composition of the labor force induced
by the increase in LA which is still below the optimal level. If
LA continues to increase, its marginal product will fall because
A"(LA) is negative and will eventually equal the wage in the
private sector, which rises as LA is increased. Thus U reaches
a maximum, for the given value of Ls, when (19) is satisfied.
This gives us one point on the U(Ls) possibility frontier as
defined in the case of the previous model. Raising Ls and
repeating the argument we must get a lower maximal value of U
because total labor input (N-Ls) is less. Thus we can trace out
the whole {/(Impossibility frontier as before and obtain the
optimal solution as the point where it is tangential to an
indifference curve as specified by the overall utility function
(9).
Note that the lower is the weight X assigned to Ls the
greater is U, LA, S, X, v and w in the optimal solution. The
less weight given to final public services and the more to
private consumption and hence infrastructure, the greater is the
skill composition of the labor force, the higher is both the
skilled and the unskilled wage and the larger is the output of
the "high-tech" X sector.
In closing, it is of interest to consider a little further
the basis for the overall utility or social welfare function V
that we have simply been postulating until now. One possibility
is that all individuals have the same sub-utility function U for
consuming private goods X and Y but that they differ in X,
the relative weight attached to public services. Under these
circumstances we could represent the X of the model as that
of the median individual, the so-called "median voter" approach
in political economy. More appealing to me, however, is the
thought that there is an "autonomy of the state" in choosing what
implicit X to adopt. Thus, a welfare state of the
Scandinavian type could choose a high X, giving considerable
weight to public services and thus sacrificing infrastructure and
hence productivity in the private sector and comparative
advantage in the "hi-tech" production. The East Asian
"capitalist developmental state" of Chalmers Johnson (1982), on
the other hand, would choose a low X and thus emerge as a highly
competitive Tech exporter due to the heavy infrastructure and
highly skilled labor force it obtains as a result of this
implicit choice. In short, "government matters".
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